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Abstract
In 2001, the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf instituted the Local 
Governance Ordinance. This law was designed to give average people a 
greater role in government planning via the creation of Citizen Community 
Boards (CCBs). Made up of twenty-fi ve citizens, and working in co-operation 
with local governments, these CCBs would undertake development projects 
such as road construction, lining of irrigation channels, and the development of 
school facilities. Since the fi rst CCBs were established in 2003, many questions 
have been raised about their effi cacy and independence. Despite the fact that 
millions of dollars of local government funds have been allocated to CCBs, 
there has been little systematic analysis of their membership and their activities. 
This study concentrated on three aspects of CCBs: their leadership; their ability 
to encourage citizen participation; and their responsiveness to the needs of 
local people. This policy brief was written in order to provide policymakers and 
practitioners with information on how CCB projects are being implemented and 
recommendations as to how they can be made stronger.
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Executive Summary
In 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf instituted the Local Gov-
ernance Ordinance, a law designed to give average people a larger role in 
government planning. Under the law, individuals were invited to create Citizen 
Community Boards (CCBs). Composed of twenty-fi ve citizens, CCBs, in coop-
eration with local governments, have the authority to undertake development 
projects such as the construction of roads, lining of irrigation channels, and de-
velopment of school facilities. Since the fi rst CCBs were formed in 2003, many 
questions have arisen about their effi cacy and independence. Despite millions 
of dollars of local government funds going to these boards, there has been little 
analysis of their membership and activities.
This study concentrated on three aspects of CCBs: 1) Their leadership; 2) 
their ability to encourage citizen participation; 3) and their responsiveness to 
the needs of local peoples. This brief was written to provide policymakers and 
practionners with information on how CCB projects are being implemented and 
recommendations on how to make them stronger. 
In particular the paper addresses four policy problems impacting CCBs: 1) 
Ineffi ciencies in the administrative systems facilitating the boards; 2) Cooption 
of the boards by an individual or a group; 3) Legal questions about ownership 
of CCB projects; and 4) Questions of sustainability that arise in part from these 
ownership issues.
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The fi eld research was conducted in fi ve districts including Lahore City, 
Faisalabad, Hafi zabad, Chiniot, District Jhang, in Punjab and Abottabad in the 
North West Frontier Province. Based on talks with policymakers and praction-
ners, I selected these districts either because they had encountered problems 
with CCB implementation or because they had a reputation of developing in-
novative practices. In each district, I conducted formal interviews with civil ser-
vants, elected representatives, and CCB organizers and focus group sessions 
with community members.
In theory, CCB policy should create new mechanisms of interaction be-
tween people and the government. However, my fi eld research suggests there 
are many problems with their implementation. Often CCBs have diffi culty in 
getting their projects started. Many CCBs do not have the capacity to submit 
technical proposals or cost estimates and must rely on consultants who can 
undermine their independence. In other cases, local offi cials undercut CCBs 
because they are seen as competitors for very limited federal funding. In some 
instances, local authorities have gone so far as to highjack CCBs for their own 
political gain. Finally, disputes over maintenance and questions of ownership 
can leave completed CCB projects in limbo. 
This paper suggests some solutions to these and other problems facing 
CCBs. To reduce administrative ineffi ciencies, the offi ce of community devel-
opment needs to be strengthened. There also needs to be more wide-spread 
awareness of CCB rules so that members are aware of their rights. And, to 
ensure that CCB projects are sustainable, the government must clarify issues 
of ownership and oversight. 
This study represents my preliminary work on the topic of CCBs in Paki-
stan. I will produce a second paper, which will include follow-up of key districts 
and a broader sample set, later in 2006.
This research was conducted under the auspices of the International Policy 
Fellowship Program of the Open Society Institute, a global foundation aimed 
promoting democratic development.
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1 Introduction
In 2001, the government of Pakistan promulgated the Local Governance 
Ordinance establishing three tiers of local government at the district, tehsil (mu-
nicipal), and union council (sub-municipal) levels1. Since Pakistan’s indepen-
dence, this is the fourth attempt to establish a system of local government. The 
three previous attempts failed because local government had no signifi cant 
powers, there was opposition from the provincial assemblies, and limited op-
portunities for citizen participation. This current attempt is unique because it en-
ables participation through the creation of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). 
CCBs are a registered group of at least twenty-fi ve citizens that are formed to 
implement small-scale development projects at each tier of government. The 
government will provide up to eighty percent of the cost of a project if the CCB 
can raise twenty percent through philanthropy or grants. The allocation of this 
budget to non-governmental actors is unprecedented and presents a unique 
opportunity to examine policy issues emerging around the use of non-govern-
mental actors as service-providers. This brief examines four policy problems 
related to the implementation of Citizen Community Boards: 1) Ineffi ciencies in 
the administrative systems facilitating the boards; 2) Procedural inadequacies 
in CCB governance that lead to cooptation by individuals or groups of people; 
3) Legal questions about ownership of CCB projects; and 4) Maintenance of 
CCB projects and lack of coordination within government departments.
2 Policy Problems Related to the Governance 
of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs)
CCBs began forming in 2003 when offi cial guidelines were published by 
the National Reconstruction Bureau. Over the last two years, approximately 
14,000 CCBs2 have been registered nationwide. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests a much smaller number have submitted proposals or implemented 
projects. In Pakistan’s most populated province of Punjab, data collected by 
the Japanese International Cooperation Authority (JICA) show that only 37% of 
CCBs have submitted project proposals and just half of those proposals were 
1 A Union Council usually encompasses three or more villages.
2 CCB Data obtained from the Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment through per-
sonal communication. Please note that this fi gure is approximate as data on CCB registration 
is not systematically collected by the government.
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approved. As of August 2005, some Rupees 8 billion in CCB grant money re-
mained unspent.3
The slow usage of funds suggests there are problems with the governance 
of CCBs. Part of the problem can be attributed to a lack of experience and re-
sources. Most CCBs don’t have the technical ability to write infrastructure pro-
posals that the government can support. The government also lacks staff and 
capacity for processing CCB registration and project proposals. 
There are also more fundamental structural problems within the CCB sys-
tem. Most notably, three individuals have disproportionate infl uence over CCB 
planning, budgets, and projects.
The fi rst is the nazim, or the elected head of local government. The na-
zim controls the funds for CCBs, and in addition, he presides over the local 
government’s assembly, which is responsible for approving CCB projects. With 
the power devolved to them, the nazimeen4 have ample opportunity to co-opt 
CCBs and their projects, especially since many also see CCBs as undercutting 
their authority. 
The non-elected executive district offi cer for community development, or 
EDO-CD, also holds disproportionate power over the body. The EDO-CD’s of-
fi ce is responsible for registering and initially approving projects before they are 
sent to the local government assembly. These civil servants have a great deal 
of power because they are appointed by the provincial government and are 
not accountable to anyone at the local government level. Many of these civil 
servants resent CCBs because they increase work loads and decrease their 
authority over development projects.
Finally, the CCB chairman also can have undue infl uence over the activities 
of the organization, especially since there is little awareness in most communi-
ties about the privileges of CCBs.
A third problem facing CCBs is their uncertain legal relationship to local 
government. According to the Local Governance Ordinance (LGO), a CCB is 
an independent nonprofi t that is able to maintain its own assets. However, the 
LGO also states that in case of dissolution or deregistration, any asset where 
the government has contributed funds shall be subsumed by the government. 
This clause has been interpreted by the Punjab government to mean that CCB 
projects must only be implemented on government land. This interpretation has 
created problems because it is hard to fi nd government land that can be used. 
3 CCB Data obtained from JICA through personal communication 08/05/2005.
4 Plural for nazim or elected representative.
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Furthermore, CCBs are reluctant to maintain assets seen as belonging to gov-
ernment. This issue needs to be clarifi ed to ensure sustainable project imple-
mentation.5
The fourth problem facing CCBs has to do with quality control and monitor-
ing. In some sense, CCBs can be seen as non-governmental groups providing 
services typically under the purview of government. CCBs, for example have 
been involved in building roads, lining irrigation channels, and other forms of 
infrastructure development. But unlike government, CCBs lack formal mecha-
nisms of accountability, such as elections. It is not clear whether there are nec-
essary structures between the public, CCBs, and the government to ensure 
quality service-delivery. 
Utilizing primary fi eld research, the goal of this policy brief is to provide rec-
ommendations to policymakers and policy practionners on how to strengthen 
policy related to CCB development.
3 Scope and Methodology of Research 
Project
This research was carried out under the auspices of the Open Society In-
stitute’s International Policy Fellowship. This project is designed to examine the 
character of leadership, quality of local participation, and issues of accountabil-
ity emerging within CCBs. To this end, I interviewed CCB leaders and members 
and conducted focus group sessions with community members to ascertain the 
background of the leaders; to what extent they involved the community in their 
decision-making, and whether the development agenda of the CCBs matched 
that of the community. A list of my interviews is attached as Annex 1.
Also, in order to gauge the level of access, I wanted to study the implemen-
tation processes employed by the CCBs. To do so, I fi rst read and studied the 
legal framework governing devolution and interviewed the various agencies 
working with CCBs. I also interviewed civil servants and elected representa-
tives at the local government level on CCB processes and held both formal 
interviews and focus group sessions with members of CCBs.  
To date, I have visited four districts in Punjab and one district in the Frontier 
Province; Lahore City, Faisalabad, Hafi zabad, and Tehsil Chiniot in the Jhang 
District and Abottabad District in the Frontier Province. My site selection was 
5 Manual of New Punjab Local Government Laws, (2005). Manoor Book House.
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made based on secondary reports on Citizen Community Board’s activity. The 
primary purpose of this phase of the study was to capture the kinds of CCB 
practices that were emerging and the quality of leadership. I selected districts 
where I had heard both positive and negative reports of CCB governance prac-
tices by practionners and policy researchers. Based on these preliminary fi eld 
studies, I will further refi ne my interview questions and fi nalize my fi eld sites. 
Local government elections were being carried out during my preliminary 
fi eld visits. CCB activity was limited because local government was suspended 
in June 2005 and no new CCB projects were being processed. However, I was 
ale to look at ongoing CCB projects and speak to the members about their past 
experiences. In addition, my preliminary fi eld work was interrupted in the Fron-
tier province because of the South-Asian earthquake, but I will be adding more 
Frontier sites in the second phase of the project.
4 Key Terms of the Study
This study is examining the quality of governance, level of CCB account-
ability, and the quality of participation that is promoted by CCBs. This section 
will defi ne these key terms. Governance is defi ned as the method by which 
leaders of the organization engage their members and manage project activ-
ity. An organization that employs principles of good governance will be run in 
a democratic fashion where the stakeholders will have an opportunity to con-
tribute to the agenda of the meeting. In addition, there will be defi ned rules of 
business that are equitable and transparent. 
Accountability is defi ned as the ability of the members to check the power 
or sanction the leaders. This could involve formally holding a referendum man-
dated in the by-laws of the organization to sanction the elected representative 
or more informally dropping by the chairman’s house to be appraised of the 
CCB’s activity. Because these CCB structures are fairly new, informal ways to 
hold leaders and government offi cials to account are more prevalent. In many 
cases, individuals from the same village are part of a greater family structure. 
While such structure may create an implicit hierarchy, it also provides informal 
information networks, which can be used to hold CCB leaders to account. This 
informal understanding of accountability is more appropriate in this stage of 
CCB development.
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Finally, participation implies interaction and association with the commu-
nity members of the organization. Participation again more formally implies at-
tendance at meetings or involvement during the implementation of a project. 
Tacitly, at a minimal level participation could also imply a level of awareness 
or knowledge. A longer discussion on these concepts will be carried out in the 
forthcoming research report.
5 History of Devolution in Pakistan
Pakistan has made several previous attempts at local government, with 
what can be considered, at best, mixed results. The fi rst local government was 
established in 1947, when Pakistan attained independence. It was built upon 
a system established under the British colonial administration and organized 
around local councils at various levels. After independence, all adults were 
franchised to participate in the elections of these local governments, but the 
practice was short-lived: Major General Sikander Mirza abrogated the Constitu-
tion of 1956 and introduced Martial Law. Within twenty days of the inception of 
martial law, Army Chief General Ayub Khan took over the government. 
Khan overhauled the previous system with the Basic Democracies Order, 
which again established district councils, town committees and union councils 
in rural areas. Shortly thereafter, in 1960, a four-tier system of local government 
was established in Pakistan. However, nine years later, General Yahyah Khan, 
Ayub Khan’s military successor transferred power from local government to civil 
servants.
At the fall of General Ayub’s regime in 1969; power was again transferred to 
the civilian government of President Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto. During his administra-
tion two versions of the local government act were created, but both failed to 
gain political traction. Bhutto’s largely ineffectual 1975 Governance Act was the 
last such attempt at local government until General Pervez Musharraf imple-
mented the present Local Governance Ordinance (LGO) passed in 2001. 
Since 2001, President Musharraf and the National Reconstruction Bureau 
(NRB), the federal agency managing the process of devolution, have estab-
lished local government in all 122 districts of the country. The union council 
nazim and naib nazim, his second in command, are the only two leaders who 
are directly elected. These elected Union Council or UC nazimeen form the 
councilors of the district assembly and the naib nazimeen comprise the tehsil 
11
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council. One-third out of thirteen UC seats are also reserved for women, farm-
ers, and other minorities. The district and tehsil nazimeen and naib nazimeen 
submit their applications to the electoral college and are elected by UC level 
representatives.6
6 Background of CCBs
Citizen Community Boards were originally envisioned by the National Re-
construction Bureau (NRB) to improve participation at the local level. The cre-
ation of these boards seems to be inspired by the model of social mobilization 
developed by the network of Rural Support Programmes (RSPs). RSPs are 
nongovernmental actors that exist in the four provinces of Pakistan. They were 
formed by a combination of private and government actors in order to reduce 
poverty through social mobilization. This model was inspired by the Aga Khan 
Rural Support Programme piloted in the Northern Areas of Pakistan in 1982. 
RSPs mobilize networks of community organizations that implement various 
development projects including infrastructure development, health, and educa-
tion provision. 
CCBs are nearly identical to the community organization established by the 
RSPs except that CCBs are registered by local government and must make 
their 20 percent contribution in cash as opposed to RSPs who accept in-kind 
payment as well. Any group of 25 people possessing national identity cards, ex-
cept those who hold formal political offi ces, can register themselves as CCBs to 
qualify for funding for similar kinds of projects as implemented by the RSP com-
munity organizations. The government provides 80% of the funding, leaving 
CCBs to collect the other 20%. This cash contribution, according to the National 
Reconstruction Bureau, ensures that there is some community ownership. 
CCBs are able to receive funding from each level of government (e.g. district, 
tehsil, and union) and other private donors. The purview and scale of develop-
ment activity is specifi ed for each tier of government. For example, CCBs who 
obtain funding from district government can work to construct roads whereas 
CCBs on a tehsil or municipal level can request funding for lane construction. 
It should be noted that this division is not always clear. For example, when the 
former nazim of tehsil Garanwalla in Faisalabad District approved a project to 
build a boundary wall around a school, he was told by a district councilor that he 
6 Manual of New Punjab Local Government Laws, (2005). Manoor Book House.
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was in violation of the rules because all education projects should be approved 
by the district council.7 
At present, the majority of CCBs in the districts I visited are engaged in 
implementing projects related to infrastructure development. District level proj-
ects include construction of major roads and development of education facili-
ties. There are several public health projects also being developed including 
building dispensary and a cardiology wing of a district hospital in Pakpattan in 
Punjab.8 Tehsil level projects include lane pavement, waste management, sani-
tation and a number of agriculture projects mostly related to the lining of water 
courses. UC level projects are very small because of limited funding and can 
work in the same sectors as the district.
Under the guidelines CCBs can apply for up to two projects in each calen-
dar year; though in some areas such as Chiniot up to 24 projects have been 
awarded to CCBs in the same year. The selection of the project is up to the dis-
cretion of the 25 members of the CCB. After the CCB is registered, it submits a 
project to the EDO-CD’s offi ce who forwards it to the relevant line department. 
The CCB works with the relevant line department offi cial to develop the propos-
al, and once the concept is approved it is sent to the offi ce of the fi nance offi cer 
for fi nancial approval. In most cases, after the fi nance offi cer has approved it, it 
is sent to the district council for a vote. Though, in some districts it is sent to the 
council before it has attained approval from the fi nance department.9 
The greatest delay in this process is receiving technical approval for the 
project proposal by the relevant line department. CCBs do not have the capac-
ity to develop project documents and cost estimates. Often, they must defer to 
agencies such as the RSPs or government offi cials. CCBs are reluctant to get 
project cost estimates made by local government offi cials because often they 
feel that the government includes infl ated costs to collect some measure of illicit 
profi ts. In addition, the government and CCBs fi nd it diffi cult to agree on cost 
estimates because government funds must be budgeted based on offi cial gov-
ernment rates10. These rates are often outdated and it is unrealistic for CCBs 
to stay within the guidelines. 11 Often, this confusion is exacerbated because at 
7 Interview with Abdur Rahman, former nazim of Garanwalla.
8 Personal conversation with chairman of Allied CCB 08/23/2005.
9 CCB Guidelines February 2002.
10 These are offi cial rates that are loosely based on market rates, but often are not revised 
very frequently.
11 At present, local government in many districts is using rates conferred in 1999. 
13
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06
times the government rates are used exclusively and at other times CCBs are 
asked to come up with their own estimates. 
At present, in Punjab there are no ceilings on the level of project funding. 
Project ceilings were in consideration in Lahore during the time of my visit. The 
suggested project limit for Tehsil Municipal Authority or TMA was Rs. 100,000 
to Rs. 500,000, anything below Rs. 100,000 was a UC project and anything 
above 500,000 belonged to the district. Some district governments in the Fron-
tier have created guidelines suggesting that a district level project is worth Rs. 
500,000, tehsil level project worth Rs. 100,000, and union level projects worth 
Rs. 50,000. However, at this stage, these are only suggested guidelines and 
not enforceable in the province.12
According to the offi cial CCB guidelines, there is a three-part system for 
monitoring CCBs. Each tier of government where the CCB attains funding is 
meant to form a monitoring committee. Each relevant line department is also 
supposed to monitor the project in each stage of development and release 
funds when it has been completed satisfactorily. Furthermore, CCBs are also 
supposed to form internal monitoring committees composed of members. In 
many areas, monitoring is exclusively performed at the discretion of the line 
department as the committee of the local government lacks the time, expertise, 
or interest. Often times, CCB members also lack awareness or interest in their 
project creation. 
7 Actors Involved in Mobilizing Citizen 
Community Boards
7.1 The role of elected offi cials
There are four major institutional actors working with CCBs: 1) The offi ce of 
the elected representative; 2) Relevant district line departments; 3) Devolution 
Trust for Community Empowerment, a government created nonprofi t organiza-
tion to support CCB mobilization; and 4) Other donor support organizations 
including the network of Rural Support Programmes.
Based on my fi eld research, the elected representative or nazim and the 
Executive District Offi cer of Community Development (EDO-CD) have a high 
level of discretionary authority over the affairs of the Citizen Community Boards. 
12 Personal conversation with Colonel Mustafa 09/27/2005.
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The nazim is the head of the district council composed of union councilors. All 
CCB projects must be voted on by the council, and based on my interviews with 
various CCB members; the nazim has considerable sway over which projects 
are approved. According to an offi cial from Hafi zabad District in Punjab, dis-
trict councils, which are meant to give fi nal approval on CCB projects, seldom 
defy the will of the nazim, and council approval in many cases is a formality. 
Two members of the New Mozang CCB in Samnabad, Lahore District, among 
others also mentioned that they were able to get their projects approved with 
greater ease because of their political ties to the nazim. The tehsil nazim of 
Chiniot, Zulfi kar Ali Shah, also mentioned that unless he personally oversees 
the implementation of CCB, projects do not move forward as line department 
offi cials at the tehsil level or tehsil municipal offi cers have little incentive to give 
priority to these projects.13
In the initial days of CCB registration, several UC nazimeen created scams 
to register CCBs so that they could claim some of the government’s money. 
According to a program offi cer from the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), a nazim and some associates allegedly held a fake motorbike 
lottery so they could collect the identity cards necessary to register CCBs.14 
Incidents like the motorcycle scam are exacerbated by DTCE’s policy of 
providing funding directly to the UC level nazimeen for CCB mobilization. Of-
fi cially, DTCE gave union councilors Rs. 40,000 for CCB mobilization. However, 
unoffi cially, the union nazimeen were told they would receive half the money for 
registering 5 CCBs and the other half with fi ve more registrations. This policy 
led to the registration of fraudulent, patronage-based CCBs.15 At present, there 
is no means to verify CCBs. Even at the project submission level, the veracity 
of the membership is not ascertained. 
In many districts, the district councils have formally or informally created 
mandates to give nazimeen even greater authority over CCBs. For example, 
in District Abbottabad in the Frontier, before a CCB can register EDO-CDs re-
quire a formal letter from the nazim. According to the EDO-CD, this new policy 
ensured that the nazimeen would be on board with CCB projects. This unof-
fi cial policy has become standard practice in Abottabad and could comprise the 
independence of CCBs. In District Faisalabad in Punjab, the district council has 
also passed an order creating a committee composed of executive district offi -
13 Interview with Tehsil nazim, Zulfi kar Ali Shah 08/30/2005.
14 Interview with Kawakita San, JICA 08/23/2005.
15 Personal interviews with Shaheen Bibi (Abottabad), HELP CCB, UC 119 in Garanwalla.
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cers from all the district line departments as well as the concerned nazim of the 
union council to resolve grievances against CCBs. While the committee does 
have a directly elected representative on board, the line ministries have much 
more authority than a UC nazim and could result in co-optation by an unelected 
authority. This committee is new in forming and it not clear what implications it 
has on the governance of CCBs. 
7.2 The role of civil servants
After the District Nazim, the offi ce of the Executive District Offi cer for Com-
munity Development (EDO-CD) is the most infl uential in working with CCBs. 
The EDO-CD is a new post created by the Local Governance Ordinance (LGO). 
The LGO dismantled the offi ce of the District Commissioner who was the pre-
mier administrator at a district level. Now, at the district level there are 10 offi ces 
under the EDO rank responsible for the functions of the District Commissioner. 
These offi cers are appointed by the provincial government and are meant to 
work in conjunction with the local nazim. However, in some cases the EDO 
has access to greater resources than the local nazim. In addition, an EDO-
CD is appointed by the provincial government and are not accountable to the 
local nazim. The National Reconstruction Bureau says that they will soon be 
creating a cadre of district level civil servants under the district nazim to create 
a communication channel between the elected leaders and the civil servants, 
but there is no information on when that is going to happen. An offi cial at DTCE 
mentioned that these district level civil servants would again be placed below 
the provincial cadre; which could create overlapping authorities undermining 
accountability.16
These civil servants are responsible for registering, approving the projects, 
and monitoring CCBs. Registration takes place in the offi ce of the EDO-CD 
at the district level. The centralization of registration hinders formation of the 
CCBs as the process requires many trips that are not accessible to the people 
living in rural areas. 
Registration involves fi lling out two copies of the CCB registration form with 
original signatures and ID cards of the 25 CCB members along with a fi fty rupee 
fee. Registration is completed in two stages. At fi rst, the CCB submits the form 
with a proposed name. Once the civil servants have ascertained there are no 
duplicate registrations, they process the paperwork. Many CCB members com-
16 Interview with Paul Oquist, Governance Advisor, UNDP and DTCE September 2005.
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plained that it was a hassle to get the forms because the EDO-CD’s offi ce did 
not have the necessary photocopies. Some CCBs also complained that they 
the government offi cials requested a small fee for processing the grant. Many 
individuals, especially in the rural areas, also do not have identity cards and it 
is a hassle to obtain one.
The delays in forming CCBs in part have to do with the capacity of the 
EDO-CDs offi ce. The EDO-CD’s offi ce is a conglomeration of the departments 
of labor, social welfare, sports and culture, cooperatives, and community or-
ganizations. While the EDO-CD heads the all of these areas; he or she does 
not have any staff members that work exclusively on community development. 
The EDO-CD loans offi cers from the social and welfare department to register 
CCBs and there is high turnover. Lahore city created an independent CCB cell 
to register CCBs, but an NGO assisting the cell in Lahore city district reported 
that this independent cell lacked the necessary authority and actually exacer-
bated delays in the registration process.17
The EDO-CD’s offi ce in Faisalabad has taken a different approach, opening 
a one-window operation in order to facilitate CCB projects. According to EDO-
CD Shabbir every Tuesday and Thursday, his staff including a representative 
from the relevant line departments, are available all day to facilitate CCB reg-
istration and project implementation. However, members of some CCBs men-
tioned that the offi cers are rarely present at the same day. 
At the tehsil level, CCB project approval is performed by the tehsil municipal 
authority, which is parallel to the district line departments. Projects submitted 
to the tehsil council are fi rst examined by the relevant tehsil municipal offi cers 
before passed on to the assembly. At the UC level, there are three secretaries 
or paid civil servants who process CCB requests. However, since the entire an-
nual budget of most UCs is Rs. 120,000, the projects are smaller and simpler in 
scale and therefore do not require much technical support.
7.3 The role of the Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment 
(DTCE)
The DTCE was created as an independent organization to support CCBs. 
In many ways, it can be considered the implementation arm of the National 
Reconstruction Bureau and the Federal Minister heading the NRB also is the 
Chairman of DTCE. DTCE is funded by bilateral donors including the British 
17 Interview with Shazia Khan of the Youth Commission on Human Rights 08/23/2005.
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Department of International Development (DFID), Canadian International De-
velopment Agency (CIDA) and the United Nations Development Program. In 
the initial days of its inception, DTCE worked with partner organizations in 13 
pilot districts in order to train and mobilize CCBs. These trainings took place 
over three days and their sessions comprised of how to register and create 
project plans.
DTCE also directly funded advocacy and project activity at the UC level and 
provided a monitoring function by conducting several studies of CCB activity. 
But overall, DTCE’s efforts for community mobilization suffered because they 
did not have a fi eld presence and were not able to coordinate well amongst the 
various local actors.
DTCE has also had trouble coordinating amongst the various training pro-
viders. For example, the National Commission on Human Development was 
responsible for training local government offi cials. However, DTCE did not en-
sure that the trainings of these government offi cials took place in concurrent 
districts. Furthermore, as discussed above DTCE’s policy of giving money di-
rectly to the nazimeen was problematic as it only led to registration of fraudulent 
organizations. 
7.4 The role of other organizations and agencies
In addition to DTCE, there were other groups involved in the registration and 
mobilization of CCBs. As discussed above, one of the most infl uential players 
was the network of Rural Support Programmes. As these entities had already 
an existing network of 72,000 community organizations (COs), they had great 
leverage in mobilizing CCBs. A signifi cant percentage of COs were formally 
registered as CCBs. RSPs conducted the trainings in seven out of the thirteen 
DTCE districts through their training department, the Institute of Rural Manage-
ment. 
RSPs have a crucial role to play if CCBs are going to be successful given 
their extensive network of community organizations. In two districts of Fron-
tier, Haripur and Charsaadda, the Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) 
has piloted a community mobilization project. In each of the districts, SRSP 
provided two social organizers (one male and female) and provided logistical 
support. This arrangement allowed more sustainable interaction between the 
organizers and the CCBs. The three days of offi cial training following the DTCE 
are not suffi cient to mobilize CCBs given that very few villagers have had prior 
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exposure to interacting with government. CCBs in these areas also formed 
partnerships with the union councils. For example, unoffi cially, CCB/CO mem-
bers were able to participate during union council meetings. While, I have not 
formally had a chance to interview the members of these districts where RSPs 
have established longer term models of social mobilization as of yet, I believe 
the RSP model of social mobilization has resulted in the registration of the 
greatest number of sustainable organizations.
RSPs have also unoffi cially been involved in fi elding questions about CCB 
project creation. For example, in District Abottabad the EDO-CD’s offi ce report-
ed that the RSPs were responsible for assisting in developing project proposals 
for at least half of the CCB projects that were approved. Many of these projects 
are submitted by community organizations that have registered as CCBs. Un-
offi cially, in Punjab some fi eld units of the Punjab Rural Support Programme 
including Sialkot have also been involved in processing CCB applications.
In addition to the RSPs, several donor agencies such as the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have formed devolution 
support programs. In many cases, these agencies support various capacity-
building programs for local government. For example, they support training of 
local government offi cials or development of fi nancial management systems. 
The JICA program is the fi rst program to have completed a complete survey of 
the capacity of union nazimeen and the three secretaries that work under them. 
Similar to the RSP model, CIDA has also created a support unit in Abottabad 
that helps to register CCBs and work on project proposals. 
8 Character of CCBs
There are four kinds of CCB players emerging in the districts I visited in 
Punjab and the Frontier: 1) CCBs organized by affl uent philanthropists, usually 
businessmen; 2) CCBs that are organized by individuals involved in politics; 3) 
CCBs that were previously registered as NGOs; 4) CCBs that have converted 
from RSP community organizations.
The most common CCBs forming in the districts where I traveled were com-
posed of local philanthropists. In this kind of CCBs, there is one dominant actor 
who typically belongs to the business community and is able to personally do-
nate a signifi cant portion of the twenty percent contribution that must be made 
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by members of the Citizen Community Board towards the project. In these 
kinds of CCBs, downward accountability is diffi cult to maintain given that one 
individual has a great deal of discretionary authority. Furthermore, this model 
raises questions of sustainability, since the projects depend almost wholly on 
these individuals. 
In some cases, the drive of one individual has led to the successful imple-
mentation of development projects. In Tharmoochia, a village in Abottabad Dis-
trict in the Northwest Frontier Province, Manzoor Khan, the CCB Chairman, 
was critical in the implementation of a water project. His village had no water 
supply for the past 25 years, but through the CCB system, he was able to 
get a pipeline from a mountain source. Khan was the single force behind this 
CCB: he registered the organization, contributed the 20% and helped organize 
construction. A member of the CCB pointed out that he had an income of Rs. 
60,000/month because of his lands and therefore did not have to work18.
While the pipeline was completed successfully, the community was not in-
volved in Manzoor Khan’s project. I met with the members of the CCB and the 
community and they were not aware of what a CCB was or the fact they were 
listed as members. Many confused the CCB with another NGO. In this ex-
ample, Manzoor Khan’s vision matched the needs of the community members. 
As explained by the villagers, they trusted Manzoor Khan (even though they 
were not involved) because he lived in the same village, and understood their 
development issues. 19
But in other cases, the CCB Chairman effectively co-opted his board. For 
example, the chairman of Green’s Housing Society (who I was not able to in-
terview), a housing development under construction, formed a CCB to build a 
north-circular road in Lahore District worth Rs. 64 million20. According to docu-
ments provided by the CCB cell in Lahore, the Green’s Housing Society CCB’s 
membership was made up nearly exclusively of local developers. These con-
tractors had a clear confl ict of interest because they stood to profi t from the 
road’s construction, and this makes the lack of local representation deeply trou-
bling.
In both examples, participation of the community was low and the success of 
the project depends on the intentions of the leader. In the case of Tharmoochia, 
Manzoor Khan successfully represented his community; however the road built 
18 Interviews with Manzoor Khan, 09/26/2005 and CCB members 09/27/2005.
19 Interview with members of the CCB 09/27/2
20 Data obtained from CCB cell, Lahore District.
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by the chairman of the Green’s Housing Society appears to be self-serving. In 
this kind of CCB there is a high likelihood that accountability is compromised. 
In other instances, elected leaders, especially nazimeen, form CCBs for 
their own political agenda. Again, in this kind of CCB, participation of commu-
nity members is limited and accountability is also severely compromised. As 
mentioned above, early in the process of mobilization, DTCE provided incen-
tives to UC nazimeen to register CCBs. Many of the CCBs resulting from this 
campaign were registered by the family of the nazim. According to my inter-
views, this discredited CCBs in the eyes of many community members.
Aside from the districts where DTCE operated, many nazimeen were 
against CCBs, which they saw as under-cutting their own authority. Given that 
the nazimeen could not ignore CCBs altogether, many also registered family 
members or business associates. These CCBs served to strengthen the politi-
cal patronage networks of the nazim. In many cases, they became active only 
during election season when votes had to be garnered.  
In Samnabad, a neighborhood in Lahore District, I toured lanes paved by 
the New Mozang CCBs. The two leaders of this CCB were sons of local en-
trepreneurs politically backed by the local nazim. The projects they supported 
were not in their own union council as stipulated in the guidelines, but in the 
neighboring union council, perhaps as a way to gain a political foothold there. 
In this particular example, there was minimal awareness by the community 
members on the activities of the CCB.21 
In Hafi zabad in Punjab, the activities of the local CCB also helped to strength-
en the patronage networks of the Bhatti family. The Bhatti family is a land-own-
ing family in this District and the CCB had paved a road running between two 
fi elds. I sat on this road for some time and all of the passersby attributed the 
construction of the road to the Bhatti family as opposed to the CCB.22
A third kind of CCB that is emerging is composed of existing professional 
nonprofi t organizations that are registering as CCBs to gain another funding 
source. These CCBs operate as user committees, and they are only active for 
the lifespan of a project. These organizations usually have an existing gover-
nance and board structure, an offi ce space, permanent volunteer or salaried 
staff, and multiple projects. HELP or Health, Education, Literacy Project is such 
an organization. It was formed by a group of concerned citizens in Lahore Dis-
trict to improve the neighborhood’s schools and health providers. The president 
21 Observation 08/21/2005.
22 Observation 08/20/2005
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of HELP registered the organization as a CCB in order to access funds to open 
a computer lab in one of the neighborhood schools. However, this proved to be 
diffi cult because none of the public schools had the necessary space to build a 
computer lab. Eight months later, HELP managed to get a plan approved from 
the district council (after allegedly paying Rs. 5000 to the relevant district of-
fi cer for education to draw up implementation plans). They also collected their 
requisite 20%; however, 18 months later they have yet to receive the matching 
project funds because the government cannot agree on the vendor.23 
The Girl Guides Association, an organization that provides activities for 
young girls in Pakistan, has also registered as a CCB in order to raise money 
for a volunteer center. They too had not received any funding as of yet because 
it was diffi cult to fi nd property that was owned by the government. In both of 
these cases, the NGOs registered as CCBs in order to gain access to additional 
funds for a particular project; however, the organizational infrastructure is pre-
existing. Accountability of the project depends on the preexisting organizational 
infrastructure. In the case of HELP, the members were also the community 
members and seemed to be engaged. The membership of the Girl Guides was 
composed of volunteers and had no real links to the community they were serv-
ing. When I asked why they had submitted a proposal for a vocational center, 
they said it was because that is what they knew how to do as opposed to having 
a genuine desire from the community.
A fourth kind of CCB consists of RSP community organizations (COs) that 
have registered as CCBs. These include women’s and men’s organizations as 
well as the network of RSP support. In some areas, there is a formal agree-
ment between DTCE, CCBs, and RSPs. In other areas, this relationship is not 
formal, but because there is an existing relationship between the community 
organization and the RSP, RSP staff assist in project preparation as well. For 
example, in District Abottabad, the RSP has assisted in preparing almost half of 
the proposals submitted by the CCBs. In this case, the community organization 
has become a CCB in order to access project funding. It is therefore necessary 
to ensure accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that one CO is not simply 
co-opting the benefi ts of the project. For example, in Abottabad I saw a road 
pavement project that was organized by a community organization president; 
however, the road seemed to be benefi ting only fi ve people. 
The problems of accountability of COs that are converted to CCBs are very 
similar to the other cases discussed above. In many cases, the chairman of 
23 Interview with members of HELP 08/23/2005.
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the COs are the most active member. In cases where there are existing links 
with the community, there is downward accountability. In other areas where the 
community is not as involved, accountability is compromised. Because COs are 
informal bodies and there are no formal mechanisms to ensure participation 
and accountability, the quality of governance varies widely.
COs who have converted to CCBs in many ways also resemble user com-
mittees. That is, these organizations form for a specifi c development project, 
but they do have enough social infrastructure to develop more general develop-
ment or arbitration roles.
In general, the RSP converted COs by far have been the most promising 
because they have been exposed to a decade or more of social mobilization. 
The success of CCBs depends on a commitment to long-term mobilization and 
if this model is to survive the government needs to partner with organizations 
with a fi eld presence.
9 Trends in Participation
The quality and method of participation are as varied as the character of 
CCBs. The kind of CCBs that have been the most successful at mobilizing 
their constituents are the CCBs that have pre-existing social structures and 
networks. For example, the HELP CCB, which strove to build a computer lab 
in its public schools, represents a solid mode of participation judging from the 
number of participants that were invited to our meeting and how much each 
of them participated. We were also told that HELP has regular meetings on a 
quarterly basis. While it was not possible to verify whether the members had 
regular meetings, they did all live within the same mohallah, or community, and 
had many informal exchanges. A community member’s right to participate was 
also written up formally in their by-laws. In this case, the fact that HELP was 
located in the same place as its target benefi ciaries and the fact that the rights 
of the members were constitutionally protected provides some measure of ac-
countability.
At the other extreme, the organizations such as the one run by Manzoor 
Khan in Tharmoochia and two CCBs in Faisalabad working on water issues, 
participation is less widespread. Most members are not aware of what a CCB is 
and frequently confuse CCBs with the RSP community organization and other 
NGOs. 
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As mentioned above, most of the participation takes place between the or-
ganizer of the CCB, one or two individuals, and the city offi cials responsible for 
managing CCB funds. In a best-case scenario there are informal links between 
preexisting NGOs or community or familial ties. In those cases, there is informal 
interaction between the CCB organizers, their members, and the wider commu-
nity. However, mostly those links are not in place and there is no participation.
Given the lack of general awareness, it is very easy for CCBs to be coopted 
by one individual or a group of individuals. In the best of circumstances, the 
needs of the people match the vision of the individual or the money is co-opted 
to serve a few people. However, in both the scenarios, individuals are not en-
gaged in decisions that affect their lives. The community members simply be-
come recipients of services as opposed to proactive stakeholders.
Given Pakistan’s power hierarchy, it is not surprising that political families 
are taking advantage of the CCB system to maintain existing social relation-
ships. However, the implementation and legislation of CCBs must strengthen 
the role of community members to ensure that the various CCB project schemes 
match their development needs. 
10 Implementation of CCB Projects
Two years after the promulgation of the Local Governance Ordinance, there 
is not much evidence of CCBs shaping the village landscape. There has been 
some infrastructure development on a small scale such as water pumps, cre-
ation of links roads, and lining of irrigation channels. 
At present, however, the rules of CCB business are exceedingly compli-
cated, primarily because there is no exclusive department that deals with reg-
istration, CCB project approval, monitoring, and disbursement. As mentioned 
above, the Executive District Offi cer for Community Development’s offi ce is 
responsible for registering and providing support to CCB. However, his offi ce 
is short-staffed and has no staff with technical skills. According to a District 
Deputy Offi cer for Social Welfare in Lahore, the process takes seven days; 
however, according to CCB members it take up to several months especially 
for the CCBs coming in from the rural areas. Delays are caused by a lack of 
information as well as lack of administrative systems in place. 
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11 CCB Capacity
CCBs have the greatest diffi culty with project proposal design. Success-
fully fulfi lling a CCB scheme requires a level of technical sophistication that the 
CCBs do not possess. The project proposals generally require some technical 
knowledge including some engineering and fi nancial training. At present, CCB 
members are now reliant on people with more technical information. In all of 
my interviews, project proposals were prepared by independent consultants, 
RSPs, or another CCB support program. CCB project approval supports people 
who are able to submit an acceptable proposal as opposed to where there is 
need. 
11.1 Purview of CCB projects
Because CCBs are a new concept and the rules of business were only fi -
nalized two years ago, many of the smaller districts lack information on how to 
implement CCB projects. First, there is some controversy in regards to what is 
an acceptable development project. In Hafi zabad, according to the DCO who 
is the highest ranking civil servant on a district level, there was a debate in the 
district council in the last term whether a janaz-gah, a shelter for funeral cer-
emonies on a burial ground, was an appropriate project for a CCB. According 
to the DCO, they were not suitable because they did not constitute a develop-
ment activity. However, while CCBs are intended to improve the development 
of a village; there is nothing in the law that limits the projects to conventional 
development objectives. The National Reconstruction Bureau in consultation 
with existing Citizen Community Boards needs to provide clarity on the purview 
of CCB activities. Certainly, these issues should not be left open under the pur-
view of an individual civil servant.
There is also some confusion about which activity belongs to which line 
department. For example, in Garanwalla, the tehsil nazim had approved a CCB 
project, which built a boundary wall around a school. However, he was told that 
because the boundary wall was around a government owned school, and the 
project came under the district’s education line department and he did not have 
the jurisdiction to approve it. He felt he was justifi ed given that the project was 
not of a technical nature. The NRB needs to distinguish between functional and 
substantive projects. In this particular case, the former nazim’s claim that he 
should have jurisdiction over functional projects seems to be justifi ed.
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In addition, the health projects are devolved to the district level. However, 
the offi ce of the Public Health and Education Department has not been de-
volved to the district level from the provincial government. At this stage it is not 
clear who has the authority to approve and monitor these projects.
11.2 Ownership of CCB projects
Examples from Punjab also suggest several questions related to the own-
ership and maintenance of the CCB projects. According to the law, CCBs and 
their members have ownership over the projects and they are responsible for 
maintaining them. However, in Punjab, the district government has decreed that 
the projects must be built on government land because they are largely funded 
by the government. This is inhibiting the development of some CCB activity in 
Punjab because the boards are not able to acquire the necessary government 
property. For example, the Girl Guide CCB in Lahore had proposed to build a 
vocational center for women; however, they were not able to use private land 
and had diffi culty in acquiring government property. 
Partially out of frustration over this policy, CCBs have begun turning over 
the responsibility of maintaining the larger projects to government. Form 4, 
which is used to approve CCB project has a box CCBs can tick absolving them 
of any responsibility of maintenance. This is clearly not a sustainable solution. 
It undermines the notion of community ownership, and in addition, puts the 
future of CCB projects in the hands of government offi cials whose budgets are 
already threadbare. Turning the projects over to government will only result in 
their failure. 
The issue of maintenance of the future CCB projects is tied to ownership. 
If the projects are a government asset, there is little incentive for community 
members to maintain the resource. Without prolonged investment, the CCB 
project are reduced to user committees. However, because a CCB project is 
not part of the regular portfolio of the various district departments, the project’s 
maintenance becomes diffi cult to coordinate.
11.3 Coordination with government
Closely related issue to issues of ownership is the coordination between 
CCBs and the myriad of government departments and authorities responsible 
for them. For example, in Samnabad, the CCB had paved inner city lanes; how-
ever, the lanes had no drains and caused fl ooding during the monsoons. The 
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CCB members explained they had not built drains because they were the re-
sponsibility of the Water and Sanitation Department. When I asked what would 
happen if the Water and Sanitation Department ripped the lanes to insert drains, 
they mentioned that was not the purview of the CCB and WASA would be re-
sponsible for repairing the lanes. Given the complexity of maintaining public 
infrastructure and the level of coordination necessary between various depart-
ments, the government needs to revise the purview of CCB activities to match 
their capacity.
12 CCB Success Stories
While CCBs have had a slow start there have been some successful prac-
tices that are emerging. As mentioned above, CCBs have put in place a mecha-
nisms for interaction between the government and the citizens. Earlier where 
there was interaction only during election time, CCBs ensure that community 
members engage government all year round. In the Chiniot tehsil of district 
Jhang, there has been great buy-in from the Nazim Zulfi kar Ali Shah. He has 
made 35% of the government’s budget available to CCBs as opposed to 25% 
available everywhere else. His tehsil has also successfully completed 64 proj-
ects including a signifi cant sanitation project.
CCBs are also becoming a vehicle for interesting collaboration between civil 
society actors and government. For example, in District Abottabad, a Member 
of the National Assembly was so impressed by the effi ciency of a local CCB that 
he transferred his development budget directly to the CCB. This transfer could 
potentially facilitate greater links between provincial and local government.
In many villages, projects completed through CCBs are the fi rst evidence 
of government funds in over 25 years. While there has been a great deal of 
corruption, in some instances CCBs have ensured that funds are released to 
the village level. In the case of Tharmoochia, water was brought into the village 
after 25 years. This positive experience could galvanize further interest within 
CCBs perhaps improving accountability in the future.
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13 Recommendations for Policy-Makers
13.1 Administrative processes
Registration should be implemented on a tehsil level. The processes 
of registration must be streamlined. The current registration processes 
serve as a disincentive for CCB formation. At present, CCBs are only 
able to register at the district level, which is inaccessible for many peo-
ple. Often they have to pay travel fares that are unaffordable for them 
and forgo their daily wages. Registration at the tehsil level will make 
the processes more accessible. The tehsil level also has the necessary 
infrastructure to process a registration. 
Communication between CCBs and line ministries especially dealing 
with monitoring should be written down. At present the monitoring of 
CCB projects is performed on an ad hoc basis. Members of several 
line departments have mentioned there is no written communication 
between the line ministries and the CCBs. Instituting a written process 
will ensure greater accountability and clearer communication between 
line ministries and CCBs. 
The EDO-CDs offi ce needs permanent and technical staff. At present, 
delays are caused in CCB registration and project processing because 
the EDO-CD’s offi ce is short-staffed. The practice of transferring staff 
on a short-term basis further muddies the lines of responsibility. Hiring 
permanent staff will ensure greater administrative effi ciency and it will 
be easier to hold the staff accountable. 
13.2 Improving accountability
The local government councils should have a CCB committee. At pres-
ent, CCBs do not have a body to turn to when there are problems with 
project implementation. Often times they appeal to the NRB or DTCE 
both of whom do not have the fi eld presence or mandate. If there was 
a genuine problem with CCB implementation, it could be addressed by 
a committee of representatives at the appropriate council level. These 
members could be given training so that they are clear on CCB rules of 
procedure.
DTCE needs to create follow-up trainings in the districts making sure to 
include a wider subsection of the community to improve accountability. 
As mentioned above, very few individuals are informed of what a CCB 
is and how it works. In order for there to be wider spread participation 
and awareness, there need to be more awareness campaigns. These 
campaigns need to be informal in nature so that they do not alienate 
people. If DTCE works through social mobilizers, they can establish vil-
lage wide information sessions and focus groups. 
CCB rules of business need to ensure that CCB participation and mech-
anisms of interaction are specifi ed in the organization’s by-laws. Given 
that the character of various NGOs differs, the CCB rules of business 
need to ensure there is some mechanism of interaction between com-
•
•
•
•
•
•
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munity members and CCBs. These mechanisms can include written 
reports to the government as well as a monitoring committee of citizens, 
which is mandated but not implemented.
13.3 Ownership of CCB projects
The government needs to revise rules of business in order to clarify 
who has ownership of CCB projects. This clarifi cation should address 
who owns CCB projects and when government funds can be utilized 
on private land. In cases where government funds are used on private 
land, the rules of business need to specify what will happen to the as-
set in case of dissolution of CCB. In cases where projects are built on 
private land, the rules need to specify the process of approving the use 
of the land.
13.4 Purview of CCB projects
The government needs to revise rules of business regarding mainte-
nance. The rules of business need to address under what conditions, 
the government will assume maintenance of CCB assets. In the case 
where government takes over projects, it must make clear who will as-
sume responsibility for the upkeep.
The purview of the various tiers of government over approving CCB 
projects needs to be clarifi ed. In the case described of tehsil Garan-
walla, the nazim approved of a project to rebuild a school boundary wall 
even though education is under the district council. Tehsil governments 
should be allowed to deal with education projects with the project is 
functional in nature.
•
•
•
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nance Advisor)
Nigat Nisa (Department for International Development, Program Offi -
cer)
Aalya Goelkar (Department for International Development)
Interviews with Nazims
Col. Ahmad Ali, District Nazim (Hafi zabad)
Abdur Rahman, Tehsil Nazim (Garanwala)
Zulfi kar Ali Shah, Tehsil Nazim (Chiniot)
Col. Mustafa , District Nazim (Abottabad)
Shaukat Haroon, UC Nazim (Abottabad)
Table of Interviews with Civil Servants
Pervaiz Sahib, DO Social Welfare (Lahore district) (retiring)
Asma Bibi, DDO Social Welfare (Lahore)
Mian Waheed, DO Finance (Lahore)
Javed Latif, Additional Secretary Local Government (Punjab)
AS Bhatti, Secretary Livestock (Lahore)
Abid Saeed, Additional Secretary Education (Lahore)
Iftekar Hussain Shah, DCO (Hafi zabad)
Choudhary Sarfraz, EDO CD (Faisalabad)
Auranzeb Abassi, EDO CD (Abottabad)
Mr. Zia-ud-din, TOI Infrastructure (Abottabad)
Sardar Abdul Qayyum, Tehsil Municipal Offi cer (Abottabad)
Sardar Naeem, Offi ce SuperintendentPlanning Offi ce (Abottabad)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Table of Interviews with CCBs
Ijaz and Fahim (Samnabad, UC 106)
Girl Guide CCB (Lahore)
Health Education Literacy CCB (Lahore)
Organizer of the Allied Community Board (Lahore)
UC 119—interview with members of the school (Faisalabad)
CCB 115 (Garanwalla)
Manzoor Khan, CCB Chairman Tharmoochia (Abottabad)
Himat or Sitara CCB (Abottabad)
Shaheen Bibi, CCB (Abottabad)
Mohammad Arshad, Mirpur CCB (CCB Chairman UC Mirpur, Bagha 
village, Mirpur)
Rashida Begum, CCB Mirpur (Mirpur Abottabad)
Meeting with Tarmoochia CCB (Tharmoochia)
Riaz, Basti-lal Khan CCB (Basti Lal Khan)
Interview with NGOs involved with CCBs
Shazia Khan (YCHR)
Nazir Ahmed Wattoo (Behbood Association)
Khatib Alam and Nadir and Tariq (DFID Project)
Fauzia Bibi (CESSED, Canadian International Development Agency)
Asrar Ahmed (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
